, golden parachutes (Cochran, Wood & Jones, 1985;  Knoeber, 1986; Lambert & Larcker, 1985; Singh & Harianto, 1989a , 1989b , poison pills (Davis, 1990; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988;  Ryngaert, 1988) and antitakeover amendments (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987;  Sundaramurthy, 1990; Walsh & Seward, 1990 ).
This study concentrates on corporate charter antitakeover amendments and is motivated by the considerable controversy that surrounds the use of antitakeover amendments by United States' corporations at the federal, state, and individual firm level.
Antitakeover amendments are often the most debated issues on the agendas of annual stockholder meetings (Pound, 1985) .
Antitakeover amendments are intended to restrict the transfer of managerial control (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981) . The study of the effect of antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth has produced mixed empirical evidence. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) found essentially no effect of antitakeover amendments on stock price (stockholder wealth). Linn and McConnell (1983) found a weak positive effect of antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), however, found a strong negative effect of antitakeover amendments on stock price. The considerable debate concerning the stockholder wealth effects of antitakeover amendments motivates our empirical research.
We consider competing theoretical explanations for the passage of antitakeover amendments i derived from the agency theory literature (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989) . The managerial entrenchment hypothesis posits risk averse managers who desire a reduction in employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981 (Walsh & Seward, 1990) (see Table 1 ). These corporate charter amendments involve no direct effect on share price paid by potential acquirers (as do fair price amendments) and involve no obvious direct wealth transfers to other stakeholders (as do "poison pills").
Insert Table 1 about here In addition to a direct transfer of wealth from stockholders to management, a possible signaling effect may have an additional stock price impact (Szewczyk & Tsetsekos, 1990) . If the market interprets the antitakeover amendment as an indication of a management which is overly concerned with protecting its own employment position, stock prices may reflect an extrapolation of current actions indicative of opportunistic managers. If the market interprets the antitakeover amendment as A nonoperating defensive measure does not necessarily directly affect the asset and/or liability structure of the firm (i.e., the balance sheet), but nevertheless affects the probability of a successful takeover attempt (Walsh & Seward, 1990 The Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis According to the managerial entrenchment view, the separation of ownership and control allows entrenched managers a wide range of discretion (Berle & Means, 1932) including shirking (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) , top management featherbedding (Myers, 1983) , taking fewer investment risks (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) and maintaining short time horizons that result in a present-value loss for the firm (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; Jensen & Meckling, 1979) . The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that managers propose and support antitakeover amendments as a pre-tender offer defensive tactic to reduce employment risk and to insulate themselves from competition in the takeover market (Kesner & Dalton, 1985) .
To be sure, many "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) mitigate the agency problem of the separation of ownership and control including: (1) the market for corporate control (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Marine, 1965) ; (2) competitive forces in the product market (Williamson, 1964) ; (3) outside boards of directors who effectively monitor top management and limit its opportunism (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Fama & Jensen, 1983a , 1983b Friedman & Singh, 1989; Mizruchi, 1983) ; (4) compensation plans based on performance (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Murphy, 1985; Walkling & Long, 1984) ; (5) equity ownership by management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Knoeber, 1986; McWilliams, 1990) ; (6) the external managerial labor market and the so-called "ex post settling-up mechanism" (Fama, 1980) ; (7) internal labor markets and the multidivisional internal capital market (Williamson, 1970) ; (8) concentrated ownership (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hill & Snell, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986a) ; (9) increased monitoring by institutional investors (Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1990; Oviatt, 1988) ; and (10) corporate culture (Barney, 1986) .
Those who hold the managerial discretion view do not deny that mechanisms have evolved which lessen the problem of the separation of ownership and control (Walsh & Seward, 1990) . The major claims which are made by supporters of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis are the following: (1) all of the institutions of capitalism listed above attenuate but do not eliminate managerial discretion (Williamson, 1964 (Williamson, , 1985 ; (2) reducing the effectiveness of the market for corporate control would exacerbate the agency problem of the separation of ownership and control (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981) ; and (3) uninformed stockholders may be in the majority, in which case stockholders may vote to establish amendments which are not in their best interest (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987) 3 .
Thus, managers are posited as exercising managerial discretion at the expense of stockholders since disciplinary mechanisms are not perfect. The organization's managers are able to balance commitments to various "stakeholders", to buffer the organization by maintaining slack resources, and to serve the interests of the organization as a "going concern" (Commons, 1934) even if it comes at the expense of stockholder wealth (March & Simon, 1958; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;  Thompson, 1967) .
The Stockholder Interests Hypothesis
The stockholder interests hypothesis posits that the adoption of antitakeover provisions increases current stockholder wealth (Berkovitch & Khanna, 1990 bidding process without additional safeguards such as antitakeover amendments (Bradley, 1980) . Thus, the stockholder interests hypothesis implicitly posits asymmetric information and/or a private synergy between the target firm and bidding firm (Barney, 1988 In this case of asymmetric information, a supermajority amendment which requires 80 percent stockholder approval rather that a simple majority of 51 percent will result in a higher P BID (say, $89) for a successful takeover. The maximum share price that the bidding firm would offer is P HIGH ($90).
A successful takeover will surely make the target firm's stockholder better off under a supermajority scenario relative to a simple majority, given that a takeover occurs . However, the supermajority amendment also increases the likelihood that the takeover will not take place and the target firm's shares will continue to sell for P L0W -Next, consider the case of a private synergy between the bidding firm and the target firm due to economies of scope in production (Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982) , market power (Eckbo, 1983) or informational economies (Bradley, Desai & Kim, 1983 which cannot be readily achieved by contractual exchange (Williamson, 1975) . A private synergy obtains when the value of the target firm to the bidding firm is greater than the value of the target firm to any other bidder. The target firm wants to extract as much of the synergistic gain as possible in this bilateral monopoly situation with the bidding firm. However, the individual stockholders find that acting as a cartel is difficult due to the incentive to cheat. As DeAngelo & Rice (1983) point out, in the case of a widely held firm, property rights (Alchian, 1965) (Grossman & Hart, 1980) . The target stockholders potentially benefit from contractual mechanisms which enforce a "stockholder cartel" in which the individual stockholder is encouraged to hold-out for a higher tender price, approaching the bidder's maximum valuation of the target (DeAngelo & Rice, 1983) . The antitakeover amendment is viewed as an institutional response to a free-rider problem associated with tender bids. Thus, antitakeover amendments which enable the target firm's stockholders to appropriate a greater share of the synergistic gains can be viewed as a special case of the insights of Schelling (1960) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) The stockholder interests hypothesis predicts that antitakeover amendments are adopted because they benefit stockholders on net. Thus, the value to stockholders of an increased ability to extract quasi-rents from bidders outweighs any additional costs which may include a lower probability of merger or increased transaction costs such as legal fees to effect a merger.
Empirical Analysis
The efficient capital market theory provides a framework for the empirical testing of our competing hypotheses (Bettis, 1983) . We study stock price changes at the publication of news items relating to antitakeover amendments. Methodologies based on the OLS market model and using standard parametric tests are well-specified under a variety of conditions for daily stock return data (Brown & Warner, 1980 and are utilized here.
The managerial entrenchment and stockholder interests hypotheses differ in the predicted stock price impact of an antitakeover provision. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests a negative impact as wealth is diverted from stockholders to management as opportunistic and/or less efficient managers protect their jobs. In contrast, the stockholder interests hypothesis suggests that equity value will increase to capitalize the larger expected quasi-rent from the idiosyncratic synergy gains. The managerial entrenchment and stockholder interests theories are empirically tested by considering the equity value impact at the time of the antitakeover amendment proposal. The proxy statement mailing date is utilized as the best available estimate of the date of the first public announcement of antitakeover amendment consideration.
Our sample of firms proposing antitakeover amendments is derived from several sources: (1) DeAngelo and Rice (1983) ; (2) the Security and Exchange Commission (1985) ; and (3) the Investor Responsibility Research Center (Rosenbaum, 1987 (Rosenbaum, , 1989 (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe 1964) (-160 to -51) preceding the event date (Linn & McConnell, 1983 Figure 1 ).
The result is consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
4
Insert Table 2 about here Several methodological issues concerning event studies must be addressed (Brown & Warner, 1985 Third, a consistent choice of market index is needed in order to properly interpret the results (Brown & Warner, 1985) . Thus, the equally-weighted market index was used in order to be consistent with the equal weighting of the firms in the event-study portfolio.
Finally, we tested for increased variance around the event date which would violate the OLS assumption of constant variance and would not allow standard interpretations of the t-tests for significance.
We could not reject the hypothesis that the residuals from the OLS regression (1) above had the same variance before and after the event date, implying that constant variance is a reasonable assumption.
The apparent robustness of our results raises questions about the conflicting empirical results referred to in the introduction of this paper. We can reconcile these results if we look at the time frames of these studies. Linn & McConnell (1983) (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987 Easterbrook and Fischel (1981) . Antitakeover amendments are in general contrary to the best interests of the stockholders of the firms that adopt them. Protective responses while serving the interests of incumbent managements are dysfunctional from the standpoint of the system as a whole (Williamson, 1975: 160-161 (Fortier, 1989 Table 3A PROVISIONS BY TIME PERIOD 1974-1979 1980-1988 
